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Summary
Network-centric warfare (NCW) focuses on using information technology to link
together Navy ships, aircraft, and shore installations into highly integrated networks.
It could significantly improve U.S. naval capabilities and lead to substantial changes in
naval tactics, doctrine, and organization.  Key programs for implementing NCW include
the Cooperative Engagement Capability  (CEC), the Naval Fires Network (NFN), the
IT-21 program, and ForceNet.  A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet
(NMCI).  Congress has  closely followed and expressed concern for some of these
programs, particularly NMCI and ForceNet.  This report may be updated if
developments warrant.
Network-Centric Warfare
The concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) emerged in 1997 and has become
the Navy’s central concept for organizing its efforts to change and transform itself for 21st
Century military operations.  NCW focuses on using advanced information technology
(IT) – computers, high-speed data links, and networking software – to link together Navy
ships, aircraft, and shore installations into highly integrated local and wide-area networks.
Within these networks, Navy and Marine Corps ships, aircraft, and forces ashore will
share large amounts of critical information on a rapid and continuous basis.  The
Department of the Navy (DoN) believes that NCW will dramatically improve naval
combat capability and efficiency by helping the fleet to achieve what DoN officials have
called "speed of  command" (an ability to generate and execute commands at much higher
speeds), which will permit U.S. naval forces to outpace adversary decisionmaking and
thereby lock out (i.e., foreclose) potential adversary strategies.1
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Key NCW Programs
The Navy’s effort to implement NCW involves several IT procurement efforts.  Key
among these are the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) program, the Naval Fires
Network (NFN), the IT-21 investment strategy, and the ForceNet program.  A related
program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).  Each of these is discussed below.
In addition to these programs, the Navy in March 2002 announced that it was
establishing a new Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM), headed by an
admiral, to be the central operational authority responsible for coordinating all IT,
information operations, and space requirements and operations within the Navy.  The
command began operating in June 2002.
CEC.  The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system uses antennas and
data processors to link U.S. Navy ships and aircraft operating in a particular area into a
single, integrated air-defense network in which radar data collected by each platform is
transmitted on a real-time (i.e., instantaneous) basis to the other units in the network.
Each unit in the CEC network fuses its own radar data with data received from the other
units.  As a result, units in the network share a common, composite, real-time air-defense
picture.  CEC will permit a ship to shoot air-defense missiles at incoming anti-ship
missiles that the ship itself cannot see, using radar targeting data gathered by other ships
and aircraft.  It will also permit air-defense missiles fired by one ship to be guided by
other ships or aircraft.  The Navy wants to install the system on its aircraft carriers, Aegis-
equipped cruisers and destroyers, selected amphibious ships, and E-2C Hawkeye carrier-
based airborne early warning aircraft over the next several years.2 The system has
potential for being extended to include Army and Air Force systems.
Tests of CEC aboard Navy ships in 1998 revealed significant interoperability (i.e.,
compatibility) problems between the CEC system’s software and the software of the air-
defense systems on some ships, particularly surface combatants equipped with the
Baseline 6 version (then the most recent version) of the Navy’s Aegis air defense system.
In response, the Navy undertook a major two-year effort to identify, understand, and fix
the problems.  The CEC system, with the new fixes, passed its technical evaluation
(TECHEVAL) testing in February and March 2001 and final operational evaluation
(OPEVAL) testing in April and May 2001.  In April 2002, DoD acquisition chief E.C.
“Pete” Aldridge, Jr. approved the program to enter “Milestone III” in the acquisition
process, and approved production of CEC systems for FY2002 and FY2003 at a rate of
5 units per year.  A further “Milestone B” review of the program was scheduled for April
2003.
CRS-3
3 Woods, Randy.  England Says TCN Could Play Role In Navy’s Network-Centric Future.  Inside
the Navy, August 12, 2002; Mullen, Richard.  Battle Lines Form Over Navy Sensor Technology.
Defense Week, July 29, 2002;   Woods, Randy.  Navy Gears Up For Next Phase of Cooperative
Engagement Capability.  Inside the Navy, July 29, 2002; Hodge, Nathan.  Navy to Test TCN On
Aegis Ships, Airborne Radar.  Defense Week, July 15, 2002; Hodge, Nathan.  TCN Undergoes
Key Test During Cobra Gold.  Defense Week, May 28, 2002; Hodge, Nathan.  Navy Needs CEC
ASAP: Admiral.  Defense Week, May 28, 2002: 8; Pierce Terry C.  Sunk Costs Sink Innovation.
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2002: 32-35.
4 Hodge, Nathan.  Navy Takes New Network-Centric Tool To Sea.  Defense Week, August 12,
2002; Nagle, David.  Naval Fires Network: The Transformation of Naval Warfare.  Navy News
Service, May 17, 2002; Woods, Randy.  Abraham Lincoln Carrier Will Deploy With Full Naval
Fires Suite.  Inside the Navy, March 18, 2002.
5 For more on IT-21 and the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), see Clemins, Archie.  Standby
for Big Reform – A Navy-Marine Corps Intranet.  Navy Times, March 6, 2000: 58; Kreisher,
Otto.  Breaking Down the Barriers.  Sea Power, March 2000: 34-36; Clemins, Archie.  It’s More
Than E-Mail.  U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2000: 56-58; Dawson, Cutler J., et al.
The IT-21 Advantage.  U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1999: 28-32.
Navy officials have acknowledged  that the CEC system (and NCW in general) will
place strains on the limited data-transmission bandwidth capability currently available to
the Navy.  One contractor has proposed modifying CEC with a capability called the
Tactical Component Network (TCN).  Advocates of TCN argue that incorporating it into
CEC will reduce the bandwidth required by CEC without reducing CEC effectiveness.
Advocates of the existing CEC approach argue that it has been modified to address this
issue.3
NFN.  The Naval Fires Network uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) IT
technology to link naval forces operating in an area into a single real-time targeting
network for coordinating gun and missile fire to attack surface and land targets,
particularly time-critical targets, in support of friendly forces ashore.  The Navy has been
experimenting with NFN in numerous exercises and is working to accelerate the
introduction of the system into the fleet.  In March 2002, the Navy announced that the
aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln would be the first warship to conduct operations with
a full NFN capability.4
IT-21.  IT-21, which stands for IT for the 21st Century, is the Navy’s investment
strategy for procuring the desktop computers, data links, and networking software needed
to establish an intranet for transmitting tactical and administrative data within and
between Navy ships.  The IT-21 network uses COTS desktop computers and networking
software and will provide a multimedia (text, data, graphics, images, voice, and video)
organizational intranet similar to the Capitol Hill intranet or corporate intranets.  The IT-
21 concept originated in the Pacific Fleet in 1995-1996.  The Navy plans to link most of
the fleet into the IT-21 intranet within the next few years.  The Navy believes IT-21 will
significantly improve U.S. naval warfighting capability and achieve substantial cost
reductions by significantly reducing the time and number of people required to carry out
various tactical and administrative functions.5
ForceNet.  ForceNet is the Navy’s new program for linking various networks that
contribute to naval NCW – including one or more of those described above – into a single
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capstone information network for U.S. naval forces.  ForceNet emerged as a program in
2002 and is not yet well defined.
NMCI.  The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is a corporate-style intranet that
will link together Navy and Marine Corps shore installations in much the same way that
the IT-21 effort will link together Navy ships.  When completed in 2003, the NMCI will
include a total of about 411,000 computer work stations, or “seats,” at scores of Navy and
Marine Corps installations in the continental United States, Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico,
Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), and Iceland.  In October 2000, the Navy awarded an industry
team led by Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Corporation a $6.9 billion contract for
installing , supporting, and periodically upgrading the NMCI over the next 8 years.  A
total of 160,000 seats have been authorized, and 20,000 have been brought online.  A 30-
day test of these 20,000 seats began in early August 2002; if these tests are successful, the
Navy plans to order another 150,000 seats.6
The 106th Congress expressed concern over the difficulty of identifying the total cost
of the NMCI effort in Navy budget documents, the Navy’s ability to finance NMCI effort
without disrupting other important Navy programs, the pace at which the Navy planned
to implement NMCI, the Navy’s ability to properly structure and manage the huge NMCI
contract (the largest networking-services IT contract undertaken by a federal agency), the
potential impact of NMCI implementation on employees of current naval networking and
telecommunications systems, and whether the network should be extended to cover
installations in the Marine Corps, which already has its own service-wide network.
In response, the Navy took actions to improve the visibility of NMCI costs in its
budget, stated that the NMCI would be financed to a large degree using funds
programmed for older IT procurement programs that the NMCI will supercede, stated that
implementing NMCI would have only a small net employment impact, and argued that
implementing NMCI in the Marine Corps as well as the Navy would result in greater
efficiencies and lower overall costs for the two services.  At Congress’ direction, the plan
for implementing NMCI was restructured to begin with a smaller number of initial
installations, so that the success of the NMCI effort could be more carefully assessed
before the program is expanded to cover larger parts of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Responding to a direction in the FY2002 defense authorization bill for the Secretary
of the Navy to name a single person to oversee the NMCI program as his or her sole
responsibility, the Navy in February  2002 announced that it had created a single program
office to manage the NMCI program, headed by an admiral.  An NMCI senior executive
council headed by the Navy’s acquisition executive will provide senior-level review of
the program office.7 
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Issues for Congress
Potential issues for Congress pertaining to NCW include the following:
Tracking implementation of NMCI.   Potential NMCI issues concern the success
of the initial NMCI installation efforts, potential ways to improve the installation process
for subsequent installation phases, and potential steps for reducing program costs.8  The
conference report (H.Rept. 107-333 of December 12, 2001) on the FY2002 defense
authorization act (S. 1438/P.L. 107-107) contained a provision (Section 362) permitting
the Navy to proceed with the NMCI project after meeting certain testing requirements.
The provision also required the Navy to submit to Congress a report on the scope and
status of NMCI testing and the implementation of the NMCI network, and to identify a
single individual whose sole responsibility will be to direct and oversee the NMCI
program.  The provision also required GAO to study the impact of NMCI implementation
on the rate structure of naval shipyards and other repair depots.  The conferees expressed
concern about delays in implementing the program and the resulting shortage of data bout
the viability and performance of NMCI.  (See pages 55-57 and 641-642 of the conference
report.)
Resolving implementation issues with CEC.  Issues include whether the
interoperability problems have been fully resolved, whether the Navy’s restructured
installation schedule is appropriate, and what, if anything, CEC implementation problems
reveal about the challenges of incorporating advanced IT into complex weapon systems.
Adequacy of transmission bandwidth for CEC.  Another issue is whether
TCN should be incorporated into CEC as part of the effort to manage limits on available
bandwidth, and what implications TCN would have for the evolution of, and acquisition
strategy for, the CEC system.
Questions concerning NCW in general.  Congress may consider other
potential issues relating to NCW in general, including the following:9
! Tactics, doctrine and organization:  The Navy recognizes that it needs
to develop new tactics, doctrine, and organizations to take full advantage
of NCW; this could significantly alter current practices, if not the
leadership culture itself, and pose challenges for retraining Navy
personnel.
! Overall fleet design: The Navy is currently adding NCW to an overall
fleet architecture that has evolved in a gradual fashion over the last
several decades.  The issue is whether the Navy has taken the relatively
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new concept of NCW adequately into account in its thinking and
planning for future ship and aircraft designs and the future overall
architecture of the fleet.
! Allied interoperability:  If NATO and other allied navies invest in NCW-
enabling technologies, U.S.-allied naval interoperability (the ability to
operate together effectively in multinational efforts) could be
significantly increased; if they do not, maintaining naval interoperability
could become increasingly difficult.
! Information security: The Navy acknowledges that it needs to work on
measures for preventing, detecting, and responding to attempts by
outsiders to illegally enter the computer networks being created to
implement NCW.
Legislative Activity
Authorization.  The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept.
107-436 of May 3, 2002, page 298) on the FY2003 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4546),
included a provision (Section 351) that extends the duration of the NMCI contract from
the current 5 years to 7 years, notwithstanding the law (10 U.S.C. 2306(c) that normally
limits multiyear contracts to a term of 5 years.  The Senate Armed Services Committee,
in its report (S.Rept. 107-151 of May 15, 2002) on the FY2003 defense authorization bill
(S. 2514), included a provision (Section 342) that would authorize DoD to modify the
start date of the NMCI contract for the purposes 10 U.S.C. 2306(c).  (pages 291-292)  The
conference report (H.Rept. 107-772 of November 12, 2002) on the FY2003 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 4546) included neither provision, the report stated (page 631),
because of the enactment of H.R. 5647, a bill that specifically extends the term of the
NMCI contract from 5 years to not more than 7 years, 10 U.S.C. 2306c notwithstanding.
H.R. 5647 was passed on October 16 and 17, 2002, by the House and Senate, respectively,
and signed into law (P.L. 107-254) on October 29, 2002.
Appropriation.  The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept.
107-532 of June 25, 2002) on the FY2003 defense appropriation bill (H.R. 5010),
commented extensively on the NMCI program, expressing concerns over the
incorporation of “legacy” computer programs into the network and the adequacy of the
testing program for the network.  (pages 198-199)  The committee included a provision
(Section 8118) prohibiting the Navy from ordering additional seats beyond the 160,000
already authorized until certain conditions are met.  The committee also added a total of
$12 million to the NFN program (pages 208 and 264.)  The Senate Appropriations
Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 107-213 of July 18, 2002) on H.R. 5010, recommended
rejecting the Navy’s $20-million R&D request for funding for the new ForceNet program.
(page 191)  The conference report (H.Rept. 107-732 of October 9, 2002) expressed
continuing concerns for the NMCI program and included a provision (Section 8118)
prohibiting the Navy from ordering additional seats beyond the 160,000 already
authorized until certain conditions are met. (pages 48, 106-107, and 329) (This section is
similar but not identical to Section 8118 as it appears in the House-reported version of
H.R. 5010.)  The conference report provides $13 million for the ForceNet program.  The
conferees expressed concern about “the lack of specificity and documentation on the
program,” and directed the Navy to submit a detailed report on it by May 1, 2003.  (page
279).  The report provides an additional $7.5 million for the NFN program.  (page 280)
